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Abstract

Under the conditionally constitutional coctrine, the Indonesian Constitutional Court may declare that
a provision of a statute is constitutional if it is read in a way described by the Constitutional Court. In
practice, this doctrine allows the Constitutional Court to create new legal norms that might not be covered
or even considered in the reviewed statute. The main question is, does the Constitutional Court have any
legitimate reasons to use such doctrine? This question is especially crucial because the Indonesian House
of Representatives once banned the doctrine by amending Law No. 24 of 2003 on Constitutional Court in
2011 and shortly thereafter, the Constitutional Court declared that the amendment is unconstitutional. In
this article, I will discuss the validity of the conditionally constitutional doctrine through the lens of various
theories of legal interpretation and further conclude that given the nature of the judicial review process,
attempting to answer the above question from the perspective of traditional legal interpretation theories
would not be fruitful. Instead, I would recommend using a pragmatic approach in dealing with the existence of
the doctrine and offer certain aspects that can be further pursued by Indonesian legal researchers to improve
the use of such doctrine.
Keywords: Constitutional Law, Legal Interpretation, Constitutional Court, Conditionally Constitutional
Doctrine

Abstrak
Berdasarkan Doktrin Konstitusional Bersyarat, Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia dapat menyatakan
bahwa ketentuan dari suatu undang-undang adalah konstitusional sepanjang dimaknai sesuai dengan apa
yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. Dalam prakteknya, doktrin ini memungkinkan Mahkamah
Konstitusi untuk menciptakan norma hukum baru yang sebelumnya mungkin tidak dicakup atau bahkan
dipertimbangkan dalam undang-undang yang diuji. Pertanyaan utamanya adalah: apakah Mahkamah
Konstitusi memiliki alasan yang sah untuk menggunakan doktrin tersebut? Hal ini menjadi krusial khususnya
mengingat Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia pernah melarang penggunaan doktrin tersebut
melalui amandemen atas Undang-Undang No. 24 Tahun 2003 tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi di tahun 2011,
dan tak lama sesudahnya, Mahkamah Konstitusi menyatakan bahwa amandemen tersebut bertentangan
dengan Konstitusi. Dalam makalah ini, penulis akan mendiskusikan keabsahan dari Doktrin Konstitusional
Bersyarat dari sudut pandang berbagai teori interpretasi hukum, dan menyimpulkan bahwa mengingat
sifat dari proses pengujian undang-undang, usaha untuk menjawab pertanyaan di atas dari perspektif teori
interpretasi hukum tradisional tidak akan membuahkan hasil. Sebaliknya, penulis merekomendasikan untuk
menggunakan pendekatan pragmatis dalam menyikapi keberadaan doktrin tersebut dan menyarankan
beberapa aspek yang perlu ditelaah lebih jauh oleh para peneliti hukum di Indonesia guna memperbaiki
penggunaan doktrin tersebut.
Kata kunci: Hukum Tata Negara, Interpretasi Hukum, Mahkamah Konstitusi, Doktrin Konstitusional
Bersyarat
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I. INTRODUCTION

PRAMUDYA A. OKTAVINANDA

Article 24C (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (“1945
Constitution”) states that the Constitutional Court (“Court”) has the authority
to conduct a judicial review of any statute (undang-undang) against the 1945
Constitution and the Court’s decisions shall be final and binding.1 Article 24C (6) of
the 1945 Constitution states that provisions related to the Court’s procedural rules
and other provisions concerning the Court will be further stipulated in a statute.2

Under Law No. 24 of 2003 on Constitutional Court (“Law 24/2003”), which
implements the above provision of the 1945 Constitution), once the Court determines
that the relevant petitioner has the required legal standing to bring a case for judicial
review against a statute3, the Court is specifically authorized to decide whether
such statute (or any part thereof) is in violation of or in compliance with the 1945
Constitution substantively4 or formally.5 If the Court finds that the statute’s provision
is in compliance with the 1945 Constitution, then the Court must declare that the
petitioner’s claim is rejected.6 However, if the Court finds the statute’s substantive
provision to be in violation of the 1945 Constitution, then the Court’s ruling must
declare that such provision does not have any legal binding power.7 If the Court
determines that the promulgation of the reviewed statute is not in line with the
procedures set out in the 1945 Constitution, then the Court’s ruling must declare
that the entire statute has no legal binding power.8 These provisions effectively limit
the form of decision that can be made by the Court in exercising its judicial review
authority.

Between 2003 and 2011, the Court developed its own doctrine to deal with
the above limitation, creating a new form of legal ruling, namely, the conditionally
constitutional doctrine. The doctrine was first introduced in July 2005 when the
Court reviewed Law No. 19 of 2004 on the Promulgation of Government Regulation in
lieu of Law No. 1 of 2004 on Amendment to Law No. 41 of 1999 on Forestry to become
Law.9 While the 2005 decision does not elaborate the reasoning behind the use of
such doctrine, it provides a first glimpse of the doctrine, namely, in case a possibility
exists that a statute’s provision might be interpreted to violate the 1945 Constitution,
instead of deciding that such provision contravenes the 1945 Constitution (and
therefore the Court must declare that such provision does not have any binding
power as per the provision of Article 57 Paragraph (1) of Law 24/2003), the Court
will declare that such provision does not contradict the 1945 Constitution if it is read
in accordance with the official interpretation of the Court.10
1
The 1945 Constitution has been amended four times. Thus, for ease of reference, I am using the consolidated version of the 1945 Constitution with commentaries by Jimly Asshiddiqie. See Jimly Asshiddiqie,
Konsolidasi Naskah UUD 1945 Setelah Perubahan Keempat [Consolidation of Draft Indonesian Constitution
1945 after the Fourth Amendment] (Jakarta: Yarsif Watampone, 2003), 55.
2
Ibid., pp. 58-59.
3
Indonesia, Undang-Undang tentang Mahkamah Konstitusi (Law on the Constitutional Court), UU No.
24 Tahun 2003, LN No. 98 Tahun 2003, TLN No. 4316 (Law No. 24 of 2003, SG No. 98 of 2003), Art. 56 (1)
and (2)
4
Ibid., Art. 56 (3).
5
Ibid., Art. 56 (4).
6
Ibid., Art. 56 (5).
7
Ibid., Art. 57 (1).
8
Ibid.,Art. 57 (2).
9
Mahkamah Konstitusi, “Putusan Perkara Nomor 003/PUU-III/2005.”
10
Ibid., p. 18.
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The Court first discussed its reasoning to use this doctrine in December 2007
when reviewing the constitutionality of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government,
Law No. 23 of 2003 on Election of President and Vice President, Law 24/2003, Law
No. 5 of 2004 on Amendment to Law No. 14 of 1985 on Supreme Court, and Law No.
15 of 2006 on the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia.11 In this 2007 case, the
Court was asked to decide whether the following requirement contravenes the 1945
Constitution: as a requirement to be elected to certain government, political, and
judicial positions, an individual must never been imprisoned by a final and binding
court’s decision due to that individual committing a crime that is punishable by
imprisonment for a maximum of five years or more.12
The Court determined that the above requirement does not violate the 1945
Constitution if it is read to exclude any political crimes or crimes that do not involve
active criminal intent (mens rea).13 At the same time, the Court also acknowledged
the difficulties caused by Law 24/2003, which limits the possible decisions by the
Court, namely, the Court can only declare that (i) the petitioner’s claim is not accepted
(because the claim does not meet the requirements for legal standing), (ii) the claim is
granted (which means that the statute’s provision will be deemed in violation of 1945
Constitution, or (iii) the claim is rejected (which means that the statute provision is
deemed in compliance with the 1945 Constitution).14 As such, the Court concluded
that its only solution is to put the conditionally constitutional doctrine as part of the
Court’s reasoning and to declare in its ruling that the petitioner’s claim is rejected.15
The Court also suggested that the issue regarding the above election requirement
can be better addressed by pursuing it through a legislative review process with
Indonesian legislators.16

The Court then changed its position in July 2008 when it reviewed the
constitutionality of Law No. 10 of 2008 on General Election of Members of the
Indonesian House of Representatives, Regional Representative Council, and the
Regional House of Representatives.17 It was the first time that the Court actually made
the conditionally constitutional doctrine as part of its official ruling.18 This case has two
other major points. First, the substantive point of the claim did not focus on whether
an existing provision of a statute is in violation of the 1945 Constitution. Rather, it
focused on whether the non-existence of a norm in a statute causes such statute to be
in violation of the 1945 Constitution.19 Second, the Court’s majority claimed, without
providing any explicit basis, that the Court has three options in deciding this case,
namely, (i) to declare that the claim is obscure (obscuur libel) because Law 24/2003
only permits a judicial review against the substantive matters of a statute’s provision,
which might implicitly mean that the provision must first exist in the statute, (ii) to
declare that the disputed provision is conditionally constitutional because it does not
explicitly stipulate a norm that is implicitly required by the Constitution to exist in such
statute, or (iii) to declare that the disputed provision is conditionally unconstitutional
Mahkamah Konstitusi, “Putusan Perkara Nomor No. 14-17/PUU-V/2007.”
Ibid., p. 123.
13
Ibid., pp. 130-132.
14
Ibid., p. 133.
15
Ibid.,
16
Ibid., p. 133.
17
Mahkamah Konstitusi, “Putusan Perkara Nomor No. 10/PUU-VI/2008.”
18
Ibid., p. 133.
19
Ibid., p. 209-210.
11
12
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The Court further explained that (i) if the Court decided to use the first option
(obscure claim), then the Court will have to declare that the petitioner’s claim is not
accepted and the petitioner may bring the case again the future; (ii) if the Court opted
for the second option (conditionally constitutional), then the Court will have to declare
that the claim is rejected, but because the conditionally constitutional requirement is
only stated in the reasoning part and not in the ruling part, the Court believed that
the requirement will have no legal effect unless the regulators are willing to further
implement the Court’s reasoning into a valid regulation; and (iii) if the Court chose
the third option, then the Court’s ruling will state that the petitioner’s claim is granted
and the entire provision of the relevant statute will be deemed unconstitutional even
though only a part of such provision is problematic.21

On the basis of the above reasoning, the Court finally took the second option
and declared in its ruling that the disputed statute’s provision is conditionally
constitutional upon certain requirements stipulated by the Court.22 The Court
also implicitly acknowledged for the first time that prior uses of the conditionally
constitutional doctrine did not have the proper legal effect because they were not
stipulated in the rulings section of the Court’s decision. As such, through the 2008
decision, the Court formally created new legal norms in its quest to ensure that the
provision of a statute is in compliance with the 1945 Constitution. Consequently,
the conditionally constitutional doctrine has evolved from a mere theoretical legal
reasoning to become a form of official ruling, at the same time.
Apparently, the Indonesian House of Representatives (“DPR”) was not pleased with
the Court’s “innovation” and in 2011, through Law No. 8 of 2011 on Amendment to Law
No. 24 of 2003 on Constitutional Court (“Law 8/2011”), amended Law 24/2003.23
Under Law 8/2011, the Court is expressly prohibited from making, (i) in case the
Court decided that the petitioner’s claim is valid, any ruling other than declaring that
a statute (or any of its provisions) that contravenes the 1945 Constitution does not
have any legal binding power, (ii) any order to the lawmakers, and (iii) any new legal
norm to replace the norm contained in the relevant statute’s provision that has been
declared in violation of the 1945 Constitution.24

Within three months after the enactment of Law 8/2011 in July 2011, the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of Article 57 (2a) of Law 8/2011 (based on a petitioner’s
motion that asked for a judicial review of Indonesian anti-narcotics law, citing that
Law 8 has violated his right to ask for a judicial review under the conditionally
constitutional doctrine) and declared that such provision is not in line with the 1945
Constitution and therefore has no binding power.25
To support its decision, the Court argues that Article 57 (2a) contradicts the
Court’s main purpose to defend the rule of law and justice, especially to defend the
constitutionality of a statute against the 1945 Constitution.26 Moreover, according
Ibid., p. 212.
Ibid., p. 213.
22
Ibid., p. 215.
23
Indonesia, Undang-Undang tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2003 tentang
Mahkamah Konstitusi (Law amending the Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court), UU No. 8 Tahun
2011, LN No. 70 Tahun 2011, TLN No. 5226.
24
Ibid., Art. 57 (2a).
25
Mahkamah Konstitusi, “Putusan Perkara Nomor No. 48/PUU-IX/2011”, 98.
26
Ibid., p. 94.
20
21
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to the Court, Article 57 (2a) also prevents the Court from (i) reviewing the
constitutionality of a legal norm, (ii) filling any legal gap that might occur due to a
statute’s provision being declared unconstitutional, especially considering that the
legislative process takes time and therefore DPR will not be able to fill such a gap
quickly, and (iii) performing the constitutional judges’ duty to find, understand, and
follow the public’s perceived values on law and fairness.27 The DPR has not yet tried
to propose any amendment against Law 8/2011 regarding that particular provision
since the issuance of the above ruling.

Coming from a civil law country, this case is interesting if not controversial.
Not only does the Court seem to simply dismiss a clear and specific rule made by
the legislators, the Court basically used only a single paragraph in its 2011 ruling
to explain why the Court’s ruling is supported by the 1945 Constitution.28 Relying
on the Court’s past rulings is not particularly helpful either because the reasoning
provided in those previous rulings also lacked support from the 1945 Constitution,
other laws, or even any other reputable sources. Indeed, the fact that the Court can go
so far in establishing the use of the doctrine is highly questionable. This issue brings
us to the main question of this paper: does the Court have any legitimate reasons to
maintain the use of the conditionally constitutional doctrine? Or in other words, is
the conditionally constitutional doctrine constitutional? Furthermore, what are the
consequences of having the doctrine in our legal system?
To answer the above questions, I will use various approaches under the currently
available theories of legal interpretation to determine whether any plausible theory
exists that could support the doctrine’s existence. Essentially, I am a pragmatist.
Like it or not, the conditionally constitutional doctrine has already existed for more
than 10 years, and it is unlikely that the doctrine will disappear soon (more on this
prediction below). As such, the goal of this paper is not to merely justify the doctrine
based on the applicable theories of legal interpretation. I have no intention to write an
apologetic excuse for supporting such doctrine. Instead, I aim to demonstrate (i) the
limit of traditional theories of legal interpretation that refuse to use the interpreters’
substantive commitments in analyzing the existence of the doctrine (which would
enable me to introduce the pragmatism approach as an alternative theory of legal
interpretation), and (ii) the issues caused by having the conditionally constitutional
doctrine and the factors that must be further analyzed to improve such doctrine
(assuming that we have no effective measures to limit the application or fully abolish
the existence of the doctrine).

II. ANALYSIS

Before we start our analysis, the role of legal interpretation in a legal system
needs to be discussed briefly. Traditionally, the term covers both interpretation and
construction of legal texts, referring to an act of identifying the semantic meaning of
a particular use of language in context and then applying that meaning to particular
factual circumstances.29 However, in practice, the concept of “meaning” might not be
limited only to the semantic meaning. As argued by Richard H. Fallon Jr., the meaning
of a statute’s provision can refer to its literal or semantic meaning, its contextual
Ibid.
Ibid.
29
See Randy E. Barnett, “Interpretation and Construction,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
34 (2011), p. 66.
27
28
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meaning as framed by the shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, its
intended meaning, its real conceptual meaning, its reasonable meaning, or its
previously interpreted meaning.30 Given these different meanings, legal interpretation
seems to be unavoidable. The question is, would it be possible to avoid any normative
commitments in performing legal interpretation, where we assume that we can obtain
a “correct” answer based on the applicable legal sources and by using a single justified
theory of legal interpretation? Or is Cass Sunstein’s claim correct, namely, that in the
end, there is nothing that interpretation “just is”?31

In Indonesia itself, no clear and systematic rules exist on how legal actors should
read and interpret the law. I am not even sure whether Indonesian law schools teach
the art of legal interpretation as part of their mandatory curriculum for their law
students. It would be a pity if such class does not exist. Any law student who actually
believes that a skill in legal interpretation is not necessary would be surprised to find
out that in practice, legal texts could be subject to multiple readings, as discussed
above. Even worse, no simple ways can be applied to resolve the issue of picking the
right “meaning.”32 This situation is why legal interpretation is both fascinating and
frustrating. Yet we cannot avoid it and as we progress through this paper, we will see
how different types of legal interpretation theories cope with the existence of the
conditionally constitutional doctrine.

Let us start with the plain meaning approach: if a reading of a legal text provides
a clear answer to a case, then further inquiries should end and the text must be
enforced as it is.33 When we apply this principle to the 1945 Constitution, we would
quickly conclude that the plain meaning approach does not offer any solution. The
relevant article in the 1945 Constitution concerning the Court’s authority to perform
a judicial review does not explain the meaning of such term at all.34 The other article
that might be relevant, namely, Article 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, only states
that judicial authority is an independent authority to perform the court’s function to
enforce law and justice where pursuant to Article 24 (2) of the 1945 Constitution, the
Court is part of such judicial authority.35 Again, no explanation whatsoever has been
given concerning the meaning of enforcing law and justice.
The above result is somehow unsurprising because we do have difficulties in
explaining the meaning of a “clear statement.” H.L.A Hart has famously argued about
the open texture nature of language that may affect how we read and interpret the
law given the uncertainties within the relevant legal texts.36 In addition, Saul Kripke
has shown that plain meaning does not really exist; each word needs context to be
understood and will be subject to the understanding of the relevant interpretive
community.37 Indeed, the full content of communication in a natural language is
30
See Richard H. Fallon Jr., “The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal
Interpretation,” The University of Chicago Law Review 82 (2015), p. 1239.
31
See Cass Sunstein, “There is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is,” Constitutional Commentary 30
(2015) p. 193.
32
See Frank Easterbrook, “Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation,” Oklahoma Law Review 57
(2004): p. 2.
33
See Abner J. Mikva and Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Process
(New York: Aspen Publishers, 1997), p. 10.
34
Asshiddiqie, Konsolidasi Naskah UUD 1945, p. 55.
35
Ibid., p. 52.
36
See further discussion in H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), pp. 128-136.
37
See Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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enriched by various factors and often goes beyond the meaning of the words and
sentences uttered by the speaker.38
To understand such context, some interpretive theories focus on the intent of the
lawmakers,39 such as purposivism40 and imaginative reconstruction41. In some cases,
intent is translated into “the spirit of the law,” causing the expressed texts of the law to
be read with the lawmakers’ purpose in mind so that the literal meaning of texts can
be excluded if it can satisfy the higher purpose.42

While this approach seems sensible, I have some reservations in using the intent
or purpose-based approach even if we assume that the materials used by the 1945
Constitution’s framers in drafting the relevant articles are available for research. The
issue is simple: laws/regulations are often made collectively by a committee, and
public choice theory has demonstrated that the legislative body/congress/agency’s
committee is a “they,” not an “it,” and they do not have “intents” or “designs” that
are hidden yet discoverable.43 Hence, seeking such collective intent is implausible if
not impossible.44 How can we know whether the 1945 Constitution’s framers have
the same purpose and goal in drafting the relevant provisions? If their views differ,
then whose views should be given more weight, and do we have any good reasons
to support someone’s view instead of other people’s view?45 As an example, should
we prefer the ideas of Sukarno, Mohammad Yamin, Supomo, or Mohammad Hatta in
understanding certain terms of the 1945 Constitution? Suppose we choose Sukarno’s
view. Is it because we have certain biases toward his ideas or because he was a
founding father of Indonesia? What about the other founding fathers? In fact, we can
also ask why the views of the founding fathers should matter. If they believed that

1982), pp. 96-97. In practice, the meaning of “interpretive community” is also unclear and yields multiple
interpretations.
38
See further discussion in Andrei Marmor, “Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic
Aspects of Strategic Speech,” in Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law, ed. Andrei Marmor and
Scott Soames (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 83-104.
39
Although social convention matters in communication and texts might have different meanings, the
intent of a drafter of legal texts is still important and cannot be easily disregarded. See Kent Greenawalt,
Legal Interpretation: Perspectives from Other Disciplines and Private Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), pp. 20-21.
40
Purposivism is defined as a method of legal interpretation that combines elements of the subjective
(the intention of the author of the text) and objective (the intent of the reasonable author and the legal
system’s fundamental values). See Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2005), p. 88
41
Richard A. Posner defines imaginative reconstruction as a method of interpretation where a judge
tries his best to think his way into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have
wanted the law to be applied to the relevant case. See Richard A. Posner, “Statutory Interpretation – in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom,” The University of Chicago Law Review 50 (1983): p. 817.
42
Holy Trinity Church v. United States can be a good example. See further discussion in Carol Chomsky,
“The Story of Holy Trinity Church v. United States: Spirit and History in Statutory Interpretation,” in Statutory Interpretation Stories, ed. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Phillip P. Frickey and Elizabeth Garret (New York:
Foundation Press, 2011), p. 5-6.
43
See Frank H. Easterbrook, “Statutes Domain,” University of Chicago Law Review 50 (1983), pp. 547548.
44
Ibid.
45
As an example, for some lawyers and judges, the Federalist Papers are considered an authoritative
document to understand the meaning of the Constitution of the United States because the document was
made by some of the United States’ most cherished founding fathers. But in reality, it is just one of many
political documents in the past that were used to support or challenge the ratification of the Constitution.
See further discussion in Ray Raphael, Constitutional Myths: What We Get Wrong and How to Get It Right
(New York: New Press, 2013), 104-105.
Volume 8 Number 1, January - April 2018 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

~ 24 ~

PRAMUDYA A. OKTAVINANDA

their views were crucial to understanding the meaning of the 1945 Constitution, then
why didn’t they mention this as an original part of the 1945 Constitution’s texts?

The next alternative is textualism, a method of legal interpretation that focuses
almost exclusively on the text of the law and other intrinsic sources of meaning,
including looking for the public meaning of the words used in the law as of the time
the law was drafted.46 The late Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court, the
godfather of textualism, explained that his interpretive method is the fair reading
method, that is, determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the
basis of how a reasonable reader who is fully competent in the language would have
understood the text at the time it was issued.47
Scalia also adds that to understand the context of a legal text, we must embrace
not just textual purposes but also the word’s historical associations acquired from
recurrent patterns of past usage and the word’s immediate syntactic setting, namely,
the words that surround it in a specific utterance.48

Another method is intratextualism, which is a branch of textualism that argues
that a law should be read in unison as if implicit links exist between its clauses, if
one refuses the tendency to read those clauses in splendid isolation, and if the terms
that specifically used in the relevant law are employed as the main tool in revealing
a community’s understanding of certain legal terms.49 This approach is similar to the
whole-text canon that asks legal interpreters to consider a law’s entire text in view of
its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.50
Textualism’s respect for texts and their original meaning is praiseworthy. What
could be a better evidence for acknowledging the law’s legitimacy other than faithfully
following the texts and their surrounding contexts without falling into the trap of
literalism?51 From the political theory perspective, if legal texts can be easily dismissed
or manipulated, then how can the law claim authority and create stability among
different political branches?52 However, textualism also has some major weaknesses,
especially in the context of interpreting the provisions of the 1945 Constitution.

First, most of the time, the constitution of a country proceeds by briefly indicating
certain fundamental principles whose specific implications will be implemented later
on.53 This situation is true for both the US Constitution and the 1945 Constitution.
John Hart Ely argues that while some constitutional provisions are relatively specific,
some are extremely open-textured, and reading or understanding these provisions is
46
Linda D. Jellum, “But That is Absurd! Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism,” Brooklyn Law
Review 76 (2010-2011), p. 919.
47
See Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul:
Thomson/West, 2012), p. 33.
48
Ibid.
49
See further discussion in Akhil Reed Amar, “Intratextualism,” Harvard Law Review 112 no. 4 (19981999): pp. 788-795.
50
See Scalia and Garner, Reading Law, p. 167.
51
According to Laurence H. Tribe, fidelity to texts is essential to avoid the temptation of resorting
to freeform methods of interpreting the law, which might cause people to question the authority of the
law, especially the Constitution. See further in Laurence H. Tribe, “Taking Texts and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review 108 no. 6 (1995):
1300-1303.
52
See further discussion in Frank H. Easterbrook, “Textualism and the Dead Hand,” The George Washington Law Review 66 (1997-1998), pp. 1119-1122.
53
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1980), p. 1.
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impossible without referring to other sources beyond the text of the Constitution.54
In other words, textual meaning has its own limits because it does not always contain
the information necessary to decide the case at hand.55 Clearly, in our case, with such
“minimalist language” within the 1945 Constitution, determining the exact meaning
of “judicial review authority” in Indonesia is impossible.

Second, given the difficulties in extracting the collective intent under the legislative
history documents that contain the discussion of “only” several hundred people, how
could we claim that we are capable of deciphering the understanding of a word by
an interpretive community whose members and sources are substantially larger
and more diverse? Are dictionaries reliable to solve the issue? On what authority?
Note that dictionaries are not made by elected officials and have no legal authority.
Why should their voices matter? Is one dictionary more valuable or better than
another dictionary? Should we rely instead on newspapers, magazines, the Internet,
books, or other valid historical sources? Do these sources accurately represent the
intent of the community, if such a thing does exist? Who should decide and on what
criteria?56 Are we able to define “interpretive community” and know precisely their
actual understanding of various legal terms?57 I doubt that we could actually rely
on Indonesian dictionaries and/or treatises to understand the meaning of judicial
review. I also doubt that we can ever define the meaning of interpretive community,
especially in a plural society like Indonesia. Claiming that our views are in line with
the perceived values of Indonesian communities is easy; proving such a claim is a
herculean task.
Third, if collective intent does not exist, then could a law have an intrinsic purpose
that can be known solely from reading the law as it is? Can we really say that a law is
intended to achieve x if we cannot really know the intention of its creator? Suppose
a law clearly states that it is intended to achieve x. What would happen if an honest
reading of that law indicates that some of its provisions are not in line at all with x?
Can and should we read the law in a way that reduces conflict among its provisions?58
However, if each law is a product of compromise among many people, how can we
assume that a law should be read in a coherent and systematic way?59
With regard to the above third issue, consider Article 20 (1) of the 1945
Constitution, which states that DPR has the authority to draft statutes.60 How should

See further discussion in ibid., pp. 13-14.
See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of
Legal Justification, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 1 and
Barnett, “Interpretation and Construction,” p. 68.
56
Example: is it better to rely on Black’s Law Dictionary or any other dictionary? What if dictionaries
provide a competing meaning? See a fascinating discussion on the use of dictionaries and other sources
by the United States Supreme Court in analyzing the meaning of “carrying” in Muscarello v. United States
in Lawrence M. Solan, “The New Textualist’s New Text,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 38 (2004-2005):
2050-2053. We can conclude from Solan’s discussion that the use of dictionary is really prone to cherrypicking.
57
Without systematic guidance on how dictionaries should be used, the use of dictionaries has resulted in inconsistent analysis and conclusions, which have added little certainty to the law. See further
in Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, “The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries,” Buffalo Law Review 47 (1999), pp. 301-302.
58
Such as using the harmonious reading canon. See Scalia and Garner, Reading Law, pp. 180-181.
59
In Easterbrook’s view, not only is reasoning from one statute to another impossible, but so is reasoning from one or more sections of a statute to a problem that is not resolved. See Easterbrook, “Statutes
Domain,” p. 547.
60
Asshiddiqie, Konsolidasi Naskah UUD 1945, p. 33.
54
55
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we reconcile that article with Article 24 C (1) of the 1945 Constitution concerning the
judicial review authority of the Court and Article 24 C (6) of the 1945 Constitution,
which states that further provisions on the Court shall be governed in a statute?
Can we argue with certainty that by declaring Article 57 (2a) of Law 8/2011 to
be unconstitutional, the Court has essentially breached the provision of the 1945
Constitution because it usurped the authorities of the DPR? I do not think that the
answer is certain. Given the lack of clarity on the meaning of judicial review, the Court
can always be argued to be simply exercising its rights to interpret the provisions of
the Constitution, including saying that DPR is actually the one that tried to usurp the
Court’s authority by limiting the form of its decisions. We will see below why this kind
of interpretation will be used by the Court.

Moving on from textualism, we can try to rely on legal canons. In essence, the
Court’s conditionally constitutional doctrine is similar to the constitutional doubt
canon in the US legal system, that is, “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Supreme Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of the Congress.”61 An earlier version of the canon (or what is called “classical
avoidance”) states that in case two possible interpretations of a statute exist, one of
which would make the statute unconstitutional and the other would make it valid, the
Supreme Court’s plain duty is to adopt that which will save the statute.62

At face value, the canon seems reasonable. Under this canon, courts are expected
to respect the decision of the legislators and not to easily disregard their choice of
policy by declaring their enacted statutes as unconstitutional. 63 In other words, the
canon is made to minimize the frictions created by the institution of judicial review.64
While the Court never mentioned this reasoning in its rulings, having such reasoning
to defend the use of the conditionally constitutional doctrine would make sense.
Another argument for defending this canon is because it supports judicial restraint.
However, in reality, it is a double-edged sword because the canon can be used for
either judicial activism or judicial restraint, depending on how you view the use
of such canon in practice. 65 If we take into account the case in Indonesia, then the
Court’s justices clearly do not apply any restraint in declaring the unconstitutionality
of Article 57 (2a) of Law 8/2011.
Indeed, this is a case where the legislators have enacted their choice of policy
through a statute (as expressly authorized under the 1945 Constitution) to basically
allow the Court to declare the statute as unconstitutional (without requiring the
Court to make any attempt to defend the constitutionality of the statute), only to find
out that their statute is unconstitutional because the Court thinks that the legislators
do not appreciate the fact that letting the Court maintain the constitutionality of the

61
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
See further discussion in Gillian E. Metzger and Trevor W. Morrison, “The Presumption of Constitutionality
and the Individual Mandate,” Fordham Law Review 81 (2012-2013), p. 1717. See also a slightly different
wording in Scalia and Garner, Reading Law, p. 247.
62
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). See further discussion in Adrian Vermeule, “Saving Constructions,” The Georgetown Law Journal 85 (1996-1997), p. 1949.
63
See John Marshall’s explanation in Ogden v Saunders as cited in David M. Burke, “The “Presumption
of Constitutionality” Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 18 (1994-1995), p. 79.
64
Posner, “Statutory Interpretation,” p. 815.
65
Frank Easterbrook, “Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?,” University of Colorado Law Review 73 (2002), p. 1405.
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statute through a different reading would be better than declaring the statute wholly
unconstitutional. Welcome to Indonesia.

This situation is why I think reviewing or analyzing the validity of a canon based
on doctrinal or political analysis is futile. Exemptions will always be present, and no
bulletproof mechanisms are available in making a perfect canon. Scalia and Garner
established the “presumption of validity” canon (which reflects “classical avoidance”)
as a fundamental canon in interpreting the provisions of a statute. 66 The question is,
on what basis? That is still a mystery until today.

Having said the above, we finally arrive at our last method of legal interpretation,
namely, pragmatism, which concentrates on the potential impact/consequences of
our choice of interpretation on practical legal problems not only to the parties directly
involved in the case but also the systemic and institutional consequence of such choice
of interpretation.67 The main difference of this method with the previously discussed
methods is that pragmatism clearly supports the use of the interpreter’s substantive
commitment in interpreting legal texts, whereas the other methods prevent (or at
least appear to prevent) the use of such substantive commitment.
The usual primary criticism against pragmatism is that it gives too much discretion
to judges to follow their policy preferences. In an interview with C-SPAN, Chief Justice
John G. Roberts of the US Supreme Court emphasized that the Supreme Court is not
a political branch. Consequently, when the Supreme Court decides a case, it is based
on the law and not on policy preference.68 The idea is simple: tenured judges who
are not democratically elected cannot be trusted with too much power.69 They are
not omniscient and they surely make mistakes, especially when they face complex
problems with limited information. Thus, limiting their ability to interpret the law
to avoid significant problems would make sense.70 Some scholars also argue that
limiting judges’ power to interpret laws (by focusing on the text and only the text)
will encourage legislators to be more disciplined in drafting them.71

Nonetheless, the same criticism can also be made against the use of history, textual
analysis, dictionaries, and canons of construction, as previously discussed above. A
smart judge can use those various methods to support his own policy preferences
while still looking as if he is restraining himself.72 Like it or not, judges care about the

Scalia and Garner, Reading Law, p. 66.
See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 395-403.
68
See Brian Lamb, Susan Swain, and Mark Farkas, ed., The Supreme Court: A C-Span Book Featuring the
Justices in Their Own Words (Philadelphia: Public Affairs, 2010), p. 6.
69
See Frank H. Easterbrook, “What’s So Special About Judges?,” University of Colorado Law Review 61
(1990), pp. 776-777.
70
See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 289-290.
71
Ibid., at 119. Although the evidence for this claim is also questionable. See Adrian Vermeule, “Interpretive Choice,” New York University Law Review 75 (2000), pp. 94-95.
72
See Richard A. Posner, “Against Constitutional Theory,” New York University Law Review 73 (1998):
3-4. For further elaboration in judicial strategic decision making, see Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 180-212. As Cass R. Sunstein stated: “the meaning
of any text, including the Constitution, is inevitably and always a function of interpretive principles, and
these are inevitably and always a product of substantive commitments.” See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 8. With respect to history, it could be argued
that judges can construct law’s own history in the process of deciding present cases through a complex
genealogical operation that accords them enormous discretion yet allows them to claim that they are being
bound by the past. See Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, “Writing History and Registering Memory in
Legal Decisions and Legal Practices: An Introduction,” in History, Memory, and the Law, ed. Austin Sarat and
66
67
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impact of their decisions.73 The grand question is, why aren’t we being honest with
that? Why do not we focus on defining things that really matter, especially given the
fact that law is ubiquitous in our life?74
I am not claiming in this paper that judges are the sole savior of the legal system nor
do I claim that all constitutional problems must be settled by judges via pragmatism,
as I have no intention to grant a rubber stamp for the Court’s action. I am simply
reminding the Indonesian legal community that the law may affect people’s life and
to a certain extent, we should care about the impact of our choices and results of legal
interpretation, especially in relation to our supreme laws that affect the entire country.
Whether this task should be dominated by judges, executive agencies, or legislators is
an institutional problem that will not be thoroughly discussed in this paper.

A discussion on pragmatism itself cannot be separated from the law and economics
movement.75 It should be noted though that the application of law and economics is
controversial in constitutional interpretation because of its endorsement of typically
a single social goal, namely, resource allocation efficiency.76 Meanwhile, considering
the constitution’s status as the supreme law, constitutional debates often involve
selecting the correct primary social goals, which may include protection of property,
egalitarianism, social justice, fairness, and many more.77 Why should we prioritize
resource allocation efficiency? Consider also the difficulties in defining “welfare/wellbeing,” which provokes some commentators to argue that the concept is useless for
policy analysis.78 Moreover, the assumption of rationality seems to be weak as people
often behave inconsistently in pursuing their self-interest and maximizing their
welfare.79 How can we build a theory of legal interpretation based on such a flawed
assumption?
Those are fair criticisms that deserve some quick replies before we can move on to
our main analysis. First of all, we need to remember that the most important concept
of economics is actually the principle of scarcity.80 If no scarcity exists, then allocation

Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 5.
73
See Frank H. Easterbrook, “The Inevitability of Law and Economics,” Legal Education Review 1
(1989): 4. Or as eloquently stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.: “The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed.” See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 3.
74
See further elaboration in Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, p. 4-5.
75
The law and economics approach uses microeconomic theory and rationality assumption in analyzing various legal issues. In this paper, the term also refers to normative law and economics that focuses on
how to maximize the welfare of society through legal instruments in the most efficient manner. See further
discussion in Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 8th edition (New York: Aspen Publisher, 2011),
pp. 3-20.
76
See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 4.
77
Ibid.
78
As an example, should we define well-being as the satisfaction of preferences? Can we properly
define preferences? Or suppose that the satisfaction of preferences is not always in line with well-being.
Can we set out an agreed list of objective state of affairs that promote well-being? See further discussion in
Daniel M. Hausman, Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),
pp. 78-87.
79
See comprehensive discussion on this subject in Richard Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, inc., 2015).
80
See Milton Friedman, Price Theory (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), pp. 1-2.
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is not needed. Law would be useless, and life will most likely be boring.81 But scarcity
exists, its power is absolute, and we need to cope with it in pursuing our end goals,
including choosing the social goals to be pursued among many available goals.

Second, well-being is perhaps difficult to define,82 but this is not its exclusive
problem because other morality principles also face the same problem. Michael
Sandel, to name one, criticizes the welfare maximization principle for making justice
and rights as mere calculation and not principle, and offers “justice as the common
good” as a better principle, focusing on defining the meaning of a good life beyond
utility and the rights of freedom.83 But what is the common good anyway? What are its
fundamental differences with the all-encompassing definition of well-being discussed
by Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow in their seminal book, Fairness versus Welfare?84
Moreover, pursuing the common good is not free; it will involve costs and may affect
the well-being of the people.85 How do we decide the extent to which we will sacrifice
well-being against the so-called common good?
This brings us to the rights-based approach. Why don’t we favor this over the
welfare maximization principle? Eric Posner argues that given the vast list of rights
(and the generality of those rights) plus the differences of conditions and needs
among many countries (which lead to inconsistent implementations), the rightsbased approach has failed to improve the well-being of the societies that need it the
most.86 This idea does not mean that human rights are not important in the calculation
of well-being. It simply means that focusing too much on rights might cause us to miss
the important aspect of well-being, which further means that we need to conduct a
proper cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in analyzing the priority of our social goals, which
is essentially a program of law and economics.87
Last but not least, on irrationality, Gary Becker eloquently shows that in the
presence of scarcity, even the most irrational person must yield because he could not
maintain a choice that was no longer within his opportunity set, forcing him to act
“rationally.”88 A recent empirical paper also supports this idea, that is, in circumstances

See Easterbrook, “The Inevitability of Law and Economics,” p. 3.
Well-being might be difficult to define, but considerable work has been done to provide a compelling
definition of well-being, and this cannot be easily dismissed. See further discussion in Matthew D. Adler,
Well-Being and Fair Distribution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 155-236.
83
See Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s The Right Thing to Do (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2010), pp. 260-261.
84
See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002), pp. 465-466.
85
Just like pursuing fairness can also cost people’s well-being. Ibid.
86
See the more comprehensive discussion in Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 137-148.
87
In this paper, the term “CBA” refers to conceptual CBA, namely, the idea that CBA can function as a
disciplined framework for specifying baselines and alternatives, for ensuring that the costs and benefits
of a rule are considered, and for encouraging reliance on evidence rather than solely on intuitive judgment. See John C. Coates IV, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications,”
The Yale Law Journal 124 (2015): 893. As for quantifying the CBA, I am still agnostic between choosing
monetary-based CBA and happiness-based CBA. I believe that both can be useful depending on the issues at hand. For further discussion on monetary-based CBA as a welfare-maximizing decision procedure,
see Matthew D. Adler and Erick A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2006), pp. 62-100. For further discussion on happiness-based CBA, see John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness & the Law (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2015), pp. 27-58.
88
See Gary Becker, “Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory,” The Journal of Political Economy 70,
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that require valuation of items whose worth is vague, scarcity leads people to rely on
relatively consistent, internally generated standards.89 As we move further, we will see
why scarcity (usually in the form of budget constraint) really matters in formulating
laws and ultimately in interpreting those laws.

By utilizing pragmatism, focusing on the ends rather than means and implementing
CBA, we can quickly analyze several major issues with the reasoning made by the
Court to defend the use of the conditionally constitutional doctrine, especially because
we know that most of the reasons stated by the Court were not explicitly discussed
in the text of the 1945 Constitution and the Court itself has acknowledged in certain
instances that it acted pragmatically. First, a highly doubtful notion—if not entirely
wrong—is that the fact that the Court can only choose between two alternatives of
ruling actually prevents the Court from reviewing the constitutionality of a statute.
The Court can of course still review the constitutionality of such statute even if the
Court has only these two options because the options are related only to the available
forms of ruling and not the Court’s authority to review the statute.
Second, the idea that the Court should fill any legal gap caused by the
unconstitutionality of a statute seems to be stretched too far. While it is true that
legislators often take a long time to enact new laws (for example, at least three years
passed from when the Court used the conditionally constitutional doctrine in its
official ruling in 2008 before the DPR issued Law 8/2011, while the Court took only
three months to deem the Law’s provision unconstitutional), it does not necessarily
mean that the Court suddenly has a new task to support the DPR’s role. As briefly
argued above, by using its authority to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, the
Court can actually impose higher discipline on DPR and the president in drafting and
designing the statutes. Why? Because given the costs of making new statutes and the
risks associated with the unconstitutionality of the statutes, the DPR and President
would have more incentives to ensure that the statutes are acceptable by the Court.
By creating new legal norms without proper differentiation and reasoning, the Court
provides unwarranted incentives to various petitioners to bring claims to the Court
for changing the meaning of the statutes instead of fighting their interests through the
political institution, confusing the role of the Court and DPR. In the dissenting opinion
to the Court’s 2008 decision, H.A.S Natabaya, I Dewa Gede Palguna, and Moh. Mahfud
MD argued that creating new legal norms through the conditionally constitutional
doctrine is not in line with the authority of the Court as a negative legislator because
the creation of new legal norms is the main task of DPR.90 Furthermore, because the
Court’s decision is final and binding, once the Court agrees to add new legal norms,
the Court will not be able to reject similar motions in the future.91 Consequently, not
only the Court will turn into a positive legislator, but it could also turn into a political
institution instead of a judicial institution.92
no. 1 (1962): 12.
89
See Anuj K. Shah, Eldar Shafir, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Scarcity Frames Value,” Psychological Science 26, no. 4 (2015): 409. It should also be noted that scarcity can at the same time tax the mind and
cause people to follow decisions that are detrimental to their well-being. See further discussion in Sendhil
Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Scarcity: The New Science of Having Less and How It Defines Our Lives (New
York: Picador, 2013), pp. 39-66.
90
Mahkamah Konstitusi, “Putusan Perkara Nomor No. 10/PUU-VI/2008.” p. 222.
91
Ibid., Indeed, in line with this reasoning, although Moh. Mahfud MD was among the dissenting judges
in the 2008 ruling, when he later became the Chief Justice of the Court, he was among those who ruled
unanimously to effectively allow the use of the conditionally constitutional doctrine in 2011.
92
Ibid., at 233.
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If the Court seriously believes that preserving the constitutionality of a statute’s
provision would be better than destroying it, then does any guarantee exists that
the Court will yield a better result by preserving such provision? If the justices have
only two extreme alternatives, namely, declaring the statute to be constitutional or
unconstitutional, then it is true that cases may exist where choosing one of the extreme
options will be highly problematic. As an example, if the Court declares a statute to
be wholly unconstitutional, then it will cause extreme hurdles to legal enforcement,
whereas if the Court declares that the statute is fully constitutional, then the Court is
unable to fix the underlying constitutional problem of the statute. What should the
justices do in such a case, taking into account that each option will impose costs to
society?
In theory, even if the justices have only those two extreme options, the justices can
still conduct CBA. If the overall costs of maintaining the constitutionality of the statute
are higher than the overall costs of declaring such statute to be unconstitutional, then
the justices should eventually choose to declare such statute unconstitutional, or vice
versa. In our above example, if the costs to the society due to hurdles in the legal
enforcement are 100 while the society’s costs of not fixing the inherent constitutional
problem in the statute are 50, then the justices should choose to maintain the statute
as it is. Opening the possibility for the Court to decide in a different manner, namely,
reading the statute in a different way, might change the above costs and benefits
calculation. However, one thing is certain: no guarantee exists that the new alternative
will reduce costs and produce more benefits compared with the other two extreme
options.
The next question is, can we then trust the Court to make the alternative reading?
Again, this question cannot be answered with political or classical theory of legal
interpretation. It is essentially a question of CBA and institutional capacity that
requires further empirical study.93 Some examples of issues to be followed up to
assess the capacity of the justices are the following:

i) Do the justices satisfy the technical requirements in analyzing the case or at
least use the service of experts who are qualified for such a case?
ii) Do we have a proper conflict system to ensure that no conflict of interest will
occur when the justices handle the case?
iii) Does the ruling improve the well-being of the petitioners and any other citizens
who are impacted by such ruling?

iv) Are the justices consistent in applying their analysis? Do they have any biases?

v) Are the rulings being effectively implemented by other political, government,
and judicial branches? If yes, to what extent? If no, why? What are the impacts?

The same is applicable to the overall legal system. We establish certain rules for our
government officials to perform their respective roles. The rules might not be perfect,
but as long as the roles are generally being applied in a sound manner with minimum
disruption to the society, we will stick with such rule. Analysis can be performed on
whether the rule maximizes the welfare of the society, and improvements can always
be recommended. But to do so, we must appreciate the fact that the most important
analyses to be used would be economic analysis and CBA.
93
As a good starting point to understand the issue of institutional capacity and its effect on legal interpretation, see Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, “Interpretation and Institutions,” Michigan Law
Review 101 (2002-2003): 885-951.
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Classical and doctrinal analyses are limited in a sense that at the fundamental
level, the source of their validity is mainly derived from head counting, namely, how
many judges actually comply with such doctrine. As for political analysis, an issue that
is also unclear is why we should use one approach instead of another approach. For
example, why do judges need to put more weight on the supremacy of the legislators’
authority in issuing statutes? Because legislators are democratically elected? Why do
we need to do that when we know that legislators are rational actors whose action
may or may not conform to the public interest? Is it because justices are unelected
officials? But what if the unelected officials have better knowledge and abilities than
the legislators? Should we still follow the legislators’ enacted statute? The list can go
on and on.
Take for example the third argument from the Court to support the use of the
conditionally constitutional doctrine, namely, that it is in line with the justices’ duty to
adhere to the public’s living values of law and justice (which would conform to typical
doctrinal/political approach). First, this duty is not written in the 1945 Constitution.
Rather, it is written in the statute relating to the Indonesian Supreme Court and its
system of lower courts. Second, suppose we take for granted that such a “moral”
duty exists for the justices of the Court. The statement itself is too vague to provide
any meaningful analysis on the relationship between such duty and the existence of
the conditionally constitutional doctrine. One can always argue otherwise that such
duty can be implemented by focusing only on the two permissible forms of rulings as
initially stipulated in Law 8/2011. Why? Because the standard is not clear and can be
easily abused to basically support anything that we want. Let us be honest. Who has
the capacity to determine the living values of Indonesian citizens? It is similar to the
problem faced by textualism when we try to determine the meaning of interpretive
community.

Despite the above problems surrounding the conditionally constitutional
doctrine, I doubt that it can be resolved by another statute. Given that the Court holds
absolute authority on defining the meaning of judicial review, unless we amend the
1945 Constitution, the Court can always declare that any prohibition to such doctrine
in a statute is unconstitutional even if no reasonable basis exists to maintain the
doctrine. From the economics perspective, this is the logical consequence of granting
such authority to the Court. If you have absolute authority to decide cases involving
yourself, then instead of recusing yourself from the case, you would have all the
incentives in this world to ensure that the case will always be in your favor.94 In such
case, does it mean that the Court will turn into an abusive institution?
While it is true that nothing prevents the Court from using the doctrine at the
moment and the Court can claim its absolute authority over the judicial review process, the Court should realize that it does not have any clear enforcement mechanism.
In practice, members of each political branch can read the 1945 Constitution’s texts
and interpret the meaning by themselves, yet their understanding might differ from
the Court’s understanding, and they might not always comply with the Court’s interpretation.95 In other words, friction could happen. In fact, it already happens among

94
Jimly Asshiddiqie warned us about this issue back in 2003 when he recommended more expansive
provisions relating to the Court in the 1945 Constitution instead of having those provisions in a statute
because the Court can always review such statute and make changes to it. See Asshiddiqie, Konsolidasi
Naskah UUD 1945, p. 59.
95
For a comparison of this issue in the US, see further discussion on the limit of judicial supremacy in
Mark Tushnet, “Marbury v. Madison and the Theory of Judicial Supremacy,” in Great Cases in Constitutional
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our government and judicial institutions. If the Court continues to use a controversial
doctrine and the doctrine is not acknowledged by other government branches, then
we would end up in legal chaos with no clear directions on what to follow. If that
truly happens, then the Court’s argument that it has a duty to fill any legal gap would
not make any sense because in the end, the conditionally constitutional doctrine only
adds unnecessary problems instead of solving problems and might actually defeat the
entire purpose of having the doctrine in the first place. Whether the balance among
the political, government, and judicial institutions in Indonesia would eventually limit
the Court in exercising the conditionally constitutional doctrine is still questionable
and is subject to further research.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the Indonesian experience, analyzing the conditionally constitutional
doctrine on the basis of political doctrine or classical theories of legal interpretation
brings us nowhere. The provisions of the 1945 Constitution are too minimalist to
allow us to establish proper reasoning to support or prevent the use of the doctrine.
Moreover, given its current authority, unless we amend the 1945 Constitution, the
Court can always make excuses in shaping its decision and the doctrine might be used
to support various opposing ideas, depending on the creativity of its users.

This situation does not mean that the doctrine is completely problematic. It is too
soon to determine that. It simply means that in analyzing the doctrine, we need to be
pragmatic, and we need to pay attention to the doctrine’s effects and how it is actually
used in practice. This would require us to perform a proper CBA and analyze the whole
set of data relating to the Court’s decisions that use the conditionally constitutional
doctrine. While I acknowledge that CBA can yield wrong results, at least it is testable,
refutable, and can be constantly improved. Hopefully, this direction could lead to a
new, exciting field of research for Indonesian legal researchers.
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